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　Lee J. Cronbach is best known for a 
reliability coefficient called Cronbach’s α. 
Cronbach’s α indicates the internal 
consistency of responses underlying a test 
(Cronbach, 1951). Being able to examine 
the reliability of test scores based on 
the data collected at one point in time, 
Cronbach’s reliability coefficients have 
widely been used among social scientists 
and psychologists in particular. In addition 
to gaining popularity for Cronbach’s α, 
his work also influenced the field of 
psychometrics and program evaluation. 
　For instance, Cronbach and his colleague, 
Paul Meehl, provided in-depth explanations 
as to what construct validity was and 
introduced the guidelines for establishing 
the validity. The guidelines became a 
standard of practice for educational and 
psychological researchers. Moreover, 
Cronbach’s view of social phenomena 
that was drastically different from the 
experimental tradition lead him develop 
the challenging technical frameworks 
known as Generalizability Theory.
　The purpose of this paper was to report 
a comprehensive review of Cronbach’s 
work by focusing on validity issues1. Given 
that his way of viewing the social world, or 
validity inquiry more specifically, changed 
throughout his entire academic careers, this 
paper discussed how he changed his views 
overtime. This paper was thus organized 
by 1) the perspectives of construct validity 
and nomological network (e.g., Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955), 2) rejections of nomological 
network and experimental tradition 
(e.g., Cronbach, 1975; Meehl, 1967), 3) 
introduction of the alternative framework 
in social inquiry (e.g., Cronbach, 1982), 
and finally 4) nature of validity inquiry 
(Cronbach, 1988; 1986; 1980). 
2. Construct Validity and Nomological 
Network
　Technical recommendation by American 
Psychological Association (APA), American 
Educational Research Association (AERA), 
& National Council on Measurement in 
Education (NCME) in 1954 set forth the 
four distinct types of validity in assessing 
the quality of test scores (APA, AERA, 
& NCME, 1954). These four types were 
called concurrent, predictive, content, and 
construct validity. 
Professor, Faculty of Lifelong Learning and Career Studies, Hosei University
Tomoyuki Yasuda
Validity Inquiry Through Cronbach’s Lens
〈Research Paper〉
4
　The first two types of validity can be 
obtained by contrasting test scores to 
certain criteria and, hence, are called 
criterion-related validity. Major differences 
between concurrent and predictive validity 
include whether the criterion concerns 
what happens after a test is administered 
(i.e., predictive) or what happens when 
test is administered simultaneously (i.e., 
concurrent). Moreover, evidence of content 
validity can be sought by showing adequacy 
of a sample of items from the universe of 
items.  
　Unlike the other three types of validity 
evidence (i.e., concurrent, predictive, 
and content validity), lack of consensus 
existed as to what construct validity was 
and how to obtain evidence for it. No 
formal standard was introduced in the 
technical recommendation; rather, a set of 
methodologies, including examination of 
known-group differences, factor structures, 
and internal consistencies, were adopted by 
most of the social scientists by convention 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
　As a result, Cronbach and Meehl 
proposed a principle of construct validation 
under what is called the nomological 
network. The nomological network refers 
to the interlocking system of laws which 
constitute a theory, and they argued that 
the nomological network should logically 
be connected to a theory that guides every 
aspect of research processes (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). 
　Central to the nomological network 
were the constructs and the links that 
connect these constructs. Cronbach and 
Meehl (1955) believed that to know what 
something was was to form the lawful 
network of relationship within which it 
occurs. A necessary condition of a construct 
can be established if it is observed within 
a nomological network. Elaboration 
occurs if researchers learn more about the 
network. Modification occurs if they change 
the network to fit into the observations, 
accepting the fact that “there may be 
alternative constructs or ways of organizing 
the net which for the time being are equally 
defensible” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 
290). 
　In other words, a sufficient condition 
can never be achieved in studying a 
nomological network, just like a theory can 
never be proven. Rather, to find evidence 
in a nomological network indicates 
that the network is the best possible 
explanations of the lawful relationships 
constituting a theory that has yet to 
be disproved. Although the law that 
governs the network may be statistical 
or deterministic, as Cronbach and Meehl 
(1955) argue, construct validation requires 
the accumulation of relevant evidence, and 
thus never ending.
3. Rejection of Nomological Network 
and Experimental Tradition
　Regardless of these seemingly promising 
ideas about the logic underlying construct 
validation, Cronbach and, especially, 
Meehl argued against the nomological 
network at a later point in time. Their 
major criticism (against their own ideas!) 
concerned the ways the network was 
studied in social science in general and 
psychology in particular. Coming from the 
perspective of philosophy of science, Meehl 
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(1967) insisted that it was impossible to 
establish the nomological network in “soft” 
science because the test of the network was 
stochastic in nature. 
　Meehl (1967) argued that stochastic 
characteristics inherent to the nomological 
network created problems when testing the 
links between the networks. To highlight 
this point, he insisted on keeping a clear 
distinction between the substantive 
theory underlying the networks and the 
statistical hypothesis which was derived 
from the substantive theory (Meehl, 1967). 
It was the test of statistical hypothesis, or 
null hypothesis significance testing more 
specifically, that was most often used for 
judging the quality of substantive theory. 
This was the very fact that Meehl disagreed 
with the adoption of the nomological 
network to the field of social science. 
　He believed that law-like relationships 
that form the nomological network are 
“correlations, tendencies, statistical 
clusterings, increments of probabilities, 
and altered stochastic dispositions” (Meehl, 
1978, p. 813). Thus, the nomological 
network in social science was “at best 
an extension of meaning and at worst 
a misleading corruption of logician’s 
terminology” (p. 813). More crudely, he 
criticized null hypothesis testing such that:
“Sir Ronald [Fisher] has befuddled us, 
mesmerized us, and led us down the 
primrose path.  I believe that the almost 
universal reliance on merely refuting the 
null hypothesis as the standard method for 
corroborating substantive theories in the 
soft areas is a terrible mistake, is basically 
unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one 
of the worst things that ever happened in 
the history of psychology” (p. 817).
　Meehl bases his argument against the 
use of the null hypothesis on the fact 
that the point-null hypothesis is always 
false in social science. It is always false 
because of the universal agreement that 
everything is correlated with everything 
else to begin with. It is thus nonsensical to 
test a research hypothesis against the null 
hypothesis. What is worse, according to 
Meehl, is the common practice that takes 
place among researchers for the test of a 
research hypothesis (H1: µe > µc) against the 
directional null hypothesis (i.e., H0: µe ≤ µc). 
　Given that the point-null hypothesis 
is always false, if researchers arbitrarily 
assign one of the two directional 
hypotheses (i.e., µe > µc or µe < µc), then 
either one of these hypotheses is correct. 
Thus, a research hypothesis is correct 
half of the time without having any 
logical relationship between theoretical 
expectations and experimental outcomes.
　Consequently, Meehl (1967) argued that 
‘the value p = ½ is a lower bound on the 
success-frequency of experimental “tests,” 
assuming our experimental design had 
perfect power” (p. 111).  It was because 
of this uncertainty in testing socio-
psychological or educational theories that 
he rejected construct validation using the 
nomological network.
　Furthermore, Cronbach (1975) expressed 
his dissatisfactions for the practice of the 
experimental tradition established by 
Campbell and Stanley (1963) and Cook and 
Campbell (1979) on the ground that they 
failed to look at the ontological complexity 
existing in the social world.
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　Coming from the perspective of 
“correlational tradition,” which is different 
in scope from that of “experimental 
tradition” (e.g., Campbell & Stanley, 1963; 
Cook & Campbell, 1979), Cronbach (1957; 
1975) proposed the research agenda that 
takes Aptitude Treatment Interaction (ATI) 
into consideration.
　By aptitude he meant any characteristic 
of a person affecting his or her response 
to the treatment. Various characteristics 
or dimensions of aptitude, together with 
different dimensions of treatment, could 
produce interactional effect in outcome. 
Citing Domino’s (1968) study as an 
example, Cronbach explained ATI that 
existed between students’ learning styles 
and teaching orientations on achievement. 
Two different types of students’ learning 
styles included were Ai (achievement via 
Independence) and Ac (Achievement via 
Conformance). Students’ who possessed 
high Ai believed that they do good work 
when they could set tasks for themselves. 
On the other hand, those who indicated 
high Ac thought they do well in meeting 
requirements others set for them.
　Matching the teaching orientations, 
or treatment, that emphasized students’ 
independence (IND) or conformity (CONF) 
with students’ style of learning, or aptitude 
(i.e., Ai and Ac), it was found that higher 
levels of achievement were observed for 
groups matched by high Ai with IND and 
by high Ac with CONF than those in which 
high Ai matched with CONF and high Ac 
matched with IND, evidencing ATI.
　What can be recognized in ATI was the 
importance of “stratification” of a sample 
in examining outcomes. As discussed 
earlier, aptitude could have been any 
characteristics of a person that interact 
with treatment, and thus the source of 
stratification should have been more than 
one.
　To address this point, Cronbach cited 
the Mischel’s (1973) argument that in 
order to predict one’s voluntary delay 
of gratification, researchers may need 
to know 1) how old a subject is; 2) his or 
her sex; 3) the experimenter’s sex; 4) the 
particular objects for which the subject is 
waiting; 5) the consequences of not waiting; 
6) the models to whom the subject was 
just exposed; 7) the subject’s immediately 
prior experience, and so forth.  Cronbach 
argues that these seven variables, or 
source of stratification, can add up to 120 
interactions, which of course is beyond 
comprehension in practice.
4. Alternative Framework in Social 
Inquiry
　The ATI in social science research, along 
with the criticism against the experimental 
tradition, led Cronbach to seek other paths 
– one of which included the formulation of 
an alternative framework adopted to the 
field of program evaluation (e.g., Shadish, 
Cook, & Leviton, 1991).
　Using the term “social inquiry,” instead 
of “social experimentation”, he insisted on 
the importance of looking at the ontological 
complexity embedded in evaluating a 
program. In particular, he believed that 
human behavior could not should not be 
reduced to a series of parsimonious causal 
(or relational) laws, because “[W]hen he [or 
she] says that such-and-such a relation is 
7
Validity Inquiry Through Cronbach’s Lens
true, ‘other things being equal,’ [she or] he 
is speaking from the experience of having 
made a lot of things equal” (Cronbach, 
1975, p. 121) – things (i.e., aptitude) that 
might be of particular importance to the 
program evaluators. 
(1) The UTOS framework
　In order to focus attentions on complex 
elements (e.g., unit of analysis, treatment, 
and generalizability) responsible for 
designing program evaluation, Cronbach 
employed a set of symbols called “UTOS,” 
representing unit (U), treatment (T), 
observation (O), and settings (S). More 
specifically, “U” or unit represents the 
population of persons about which some 
conclusions are sought; “T” or treatment 
denotes the plan for the program and its 
installation; “O” or observation represents 
the plan for collecting some types of data; 
and “S” or settings stand for situations in 
which the study is made.
　In reality, instances on which a study 
(e.g., data collection) was conducted were 
represented as lower- and upper-case 
symbols “utoS,” where “uto” represents 
research participants (u), intervention or 
research treatment (t), and observation 
(t) obtained out of treatment (i.e., 
measurement). Notice that Cronbach made 
settings (S) as upper-case “S,” for a setting 
was unique to each study (situations, time, 
conditions, etc.).
　Furthermore, Cronbach designated 
“*UTOS” (pronounced “star UTOS”) as a 
situation or class about which a conclusion 
was made. Specifically, *U represents a 
set of units not as fully representative of 
“U,” *T represents a set of treatment that 
is different from treatment (intervention) 
that was implemented in a study, *O 
characterizes outcomes not measured 
directly in the original study, and *S 
corresponds to the settings when and 
where the findings are to be generalized.
　Cronbach’s (1982) argument originated 
from the limited reach in traditional 
internal validity (i.e., sin qua non) as 
discussed in Campbell and Stanley 
(1963) and Cook and Campbell (1979). 
Instead, Cronbach believed that external 
validity was of primary interest and thus 
should have been the focus of program 
evaluation. In making his case, Cronbach 
explained that the causal statements for 
which internal validity were to be claimed 
were extremely restricted because causal 
conclusions were conditional and thus 
limited the applications of such conclusions. 
A social phenomenon did not reside within 
a stable, isolated system, and hence causal 
language was loose at best.
(2) Validity under the UTOS framework
　Cronbach (1982) viewed internal validity 
as a statement about UTOS made on the 
basis of study conducted on utoS. “The 
inference is internal to UTOS in the sense 
that utoS is a subset of observations 
from that universe” (Cronbach, 1982, p. 
106). Thus, he viewed internal validity as 
reproducibility, such that the utoS was for 
the UTOS.
　He continued by saying that internal 
validity, in Campbell’s term, concerned 
only about “t” (cause) to “o” (effect), making 
“internal validity a property of trivial, past-
tense, and local statements” (Cronbach, 
1982, p. 137).
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　Treatment (T) is embedded in and hence 
cannot be separated from U, O, and S. 
We need to speak of causation by paying 
attention to this fact. Cronbach argued that 
the homogeneous sample of not only “u” but 
also “toS” should be sought for the purpose 
of showing the evidence of causality. Thus, 
the internal validity from Cronbach’s lens 
involved with whether or not the reported 
facts on utoS were dependable.
　Cronbach (1982) also viewed external 
validity differently from Campbell and 
his colleague. In fact, Campbell’s external 
validity required that the research findings 
could be generalized to the population, 
hence uto(S) to UTO(S), but in fact this was 
internal validity for Cronbach (Shadish et 
al., 1991).
　Instead of generalizability, Cronbach 
(1982) recognized external validity as 
“extrapolation,” reflecting his point of view 
that this validity signified a deliberate 
projection to a situation outside the range 
where information was gathered. Thus, 
statistical summaries on the sample 
(utoS), as well as estimates for UTOS, were 
usually not an adequate base for inference 
about *UTOS (i.e., external validity 
evidence).
　Questions as to why local “t” worked 
well or poorly need to be understood in 
reference to *UTOS in order to maximize 
external validity.  Cronbach believed 
that the alternative sources of social 
information, including such qualitative 
knowledge as history, culture, and folktale, 
should be incorporated in addressing the 
differences between utoS and *UTOS. 
Thus, the evidence of external validity was 
less systematic and stylized than statistical 
inference. Specifically, the range of 
extrapolation needs to be shortened in order 
to improve the credibility of extrapolation 
– that is, a part or all of the original utoS 
should be close to *UTOS. Cronbach argued 
that careful documentation especially for 
“S” was considered necessary, given that 
setting was unique to each study. 
5. Validity Inquiry
　Having examined various points of view 
that Cronbach and colleagues subscribed 
the question remains, how validity inquiry 
should be conducted.
　The comprehensive analyses of validity 
issues as discussed in psychology and 
related fields were beyond the scope 
of this paper2. Yet, Cronbach (1980) 
maintained that validity inquiry (e.g., test 
validation) calls for integration of many 
types of evidence; that is, the varieties of 
investigation are not alternatives and any 
one of which would be adequate.
　Indeed, S. Messick (e.g., Messick, 1995; 
1989) later on identified the significance 
of integrating various evidences when 
inquiring validity, such that “[T]he unified 
concept of validity integrates consideration 
of content, criteria, and consequences 
into a construct framework for testing 
rational hypotheses about theoretically 
relevant relationships” (Messick, 1989, 
p. 64). It was the construct validity on 
which this unifying view of validity was 
based. Accordingly, validity was defined 
as “an overall evaluative judgment of the 
degree to which empirical evidence and 
theoretical rationales support the adequacy 
and appropriateness of interpretations and 
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actions on the basis of test scores or other 
modes of assessment” (Messick, 1995, p. 
741; Messick, 1989) 3.
　Cronbach (1988; 1986; 1980) also 
identified the importance of not only the 
technical aspect of validity inquiry but 
also the social aspect of it. Concurrent to 
Messick’s point of view, Cronbach believed 
that effective communication of evidence 
to the relevant audience was central 
to the improvement of social aspects of 
validity inquiry (i.e., credibility in social 
inquiry) 4. Among all, utility was thought 
of as essential in social inquiry. There were 
a total of five perspectives as significant 
for engaging in social inquiry – function, 
political, operationalist, economic, and 
explanatory perspectives (Cronbach, 1988).
　In explaining functional perspective, 
first, Cronbach argued “worth” rather than 
“truth” should be the focus in social inquiry. 
He also focused attentions on the political 
perspective. There were issues such as 
fairness and bias being of primary concern. 
The operationist perspective included the 
content and construct on which validity 
evidence were sought.
　From utility point of view, moreover, 
he argued about the importance of the 
economic perspective. In particular, 
what validity evidence was sought and 
how it was to be used (e.g., cost and 
benefit) could have become of central 
interest to researchers, practitioners, and 
administrators. Finally, the bridge between 
theoretical and practical point of views was 
considered critical under the explanatory 
perspective.
　As has been discussed throughout this 
paper, validity inquiry was to be conducted 
by taking into consideration not only the 
technical manipulation of research methods 
but also the conceptual and rhetorical 
arguments about the whole spectrum of 
issues. These issues were situated wide-
ranged from psychological to societal in 
practice. Thus, validity inquiry, in and 
of itself, required various theories and 
methods of investigation.
  Endnotes
1 This paper was written based on the author’s 
class presentation titled “Evolving and Rhetorical 
Nature of Validation: A perspective of Lee J. 
Cronbach” given in the EDPSY 555 class (Validity 
by Dr. Hoi K. Suen) at the Pennsylvania State 
University Educational Psychology Ph. D. 
Program in 2002.
2 Non-traditional yet substantially important 
approach to validity can be found in an argument-
based approach to validity, where observation, 
generalization, extrapolation, theory-based 
inferences, decisions, and technical interferences 
were to be sought in establishing the interpretive 
argument (Kane, 1992). Early development of 
the field of program evaluation also identified 
the importance of validity argument (e.g., House, 
1980). 
3 It was thus important for researchers to engage 
in validity inquiry by acknowledging the fact 
that “the appropriateness, meaningfulness, 
and usefulness of score-based inferences are 
inseparable and that unifying force is empirically 
grounded construct interpretation” (Messick, 1989, 
p. 64).
4 Although Cronbach’s perspective is strikingly 
different from that of experimental tradition (e.g., 
D. T. Campbell’s experimental design) as has been 
discussed throughout this paper, it was Campbell 
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who also viewed that the knowledge construction 
in social science should be via the disputatious 
community of truth seekers – a group of scientist 
which is “open, mutually reinforcing but critical 
commentary on the procedures and assumptions 
underlying any knowledge claim” (Shadish et al., 
1991, p. 120).
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